Musar for Bava Kamma 51:16
ולפרוך מה לניזקין דרגל שכן ישנן באש מטמון
might have inferred it from the law applicable to [mere] damage done by Foot.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And not from the law applicable to manslaughter committed by Foot, in which case there may be no ransom at all. [Thus: If in the case of Foot, which involves no liability for damage on public ground, there is liability to pay in full in the plaintiff's premises, does it not follow that, in the case of Horn, involving as it does payment of half ransom on public ground, there should be payment of full ransom in plaintiff's premises.] ');"><sup>25</sup></span> But [if so] cannot the inference be refuted? For indeed what analogy could be drawn to damage done by Foot, the liability for which is common also with Fire [whereas ransom does not apply to Fire]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the person liable for arson may, in such a case, be indicted for manslaughter; cf. supra pp. 37-38 and p. 113. ');"><sup>26</sup></span>
Shenei Luchot HaBerit
Shenei Luchot HaBerit
Shenei Luchot HaBerit
אדם הראשון, first man, was considered מועד לעולם, forewarned from the outset (Baba Kama 3). This means that he was unable to make excuses for his sin, having been told by G–d directly what he must not do. יעקב on the other hand, is described as איש תם (the choicest of human beings), and only had to pay half for any sins he had committed (i.e. cost of any damage he caused), since he never died (cf. Taanit 5, that יעקב אבינו לא מת). This means that though he "died," he did not die completely as was explained in that context (see Akeydat Yitzchak chapter 32).